Countermeasures Against Blinding Attack on Superconducting Nanowire Detectors for QKD
1 Moscow Pedagogical State University, 29 Malaya Pirogovskaya Str. Moscow 119991, Russia
2 Russian Quantum Center, 100 Novaya Str., Skolkovo, Moscow 143025, Russia
3 Institute for Quantum Computing, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, N2L~3G1, Canada
a Corresponding author: email@example.com
Published online: 25 September 2015
Nowadays, the superconducting single-photon detectors (SSPDs) are used in Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) instead of single-photon avalanche photodiodes. Recently bright-light control of the SSPD has been demonstrated. This attack employed a “backdoor” in the detector biasing technique. We developed the autoreset system which returns the SSPD to superconducting state when it is latched. We investigate latched state of the SSPD and define limit conditions for effective blinding attack. Peculiarity of the blinding attack is a long nonsingle photon response of the SSPD. It is much longer than usual single photon response. Besides, we need follow up response duration of the SSPD. These countermeasures allow us to prevent blind attack on SSPDs for Quantum Key Distribution.
Key words: quantum cryptography / information security / superconducting single-photon detector / blinding attack
© Owned by the authors, published by EDP Sciences, 2015
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